

Semiautomatic Security Requirements Engineering and Evolution using Decision Documentation, Heuristics, and User Monitoring

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
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
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


- Medical information system iTrust: Management of health records for patients and work schedule for staff
 - Specified in 55 use cases and implemented as web application by Realsearch Research Group (North Carolina State University)
 - **Active evolution** (23 versions of requirements, 17 versions of code)




Motivation: Decisions on Security Are Important

- Great importance of security requirements for long-living information systems
- Many decisions on how to implement and prioritize security requirements




Motivation: Decision Knowledge Erodes Quickly

- But: Security requirements engineering is often performed **manually** → Erosion of knowledge about decisions on security requirements
 - Incomplete documentation
 - Quickly outdated decisions and documentation



Our Approach: Semiautomatic Decision Documentation


- Incorporate potential security vulnerabilities with counter-measures



- Incorporate use case frequencies and deviations of user behavior from expectations

Component: Decision Documentation


- **Decision knowledge** is knowledge about all decision-related questions, solutions, context information/rationales
- Benefit of documentation: Support software engineers in **finding and exploiting previous security-related decisions**




- To decrease effort and support evolution, **natural language requirements** need to be assessed automatically
- Attack-centric approach:
 - Transform requirements in analysis model using NLP
 - Search for suspicious interactions by incorporating general attack patterns and reported security incidents
 - Retrieve potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures from the security knowledge base
- Example for use case 6:
 - The **patient types** a last **name** or partial last **name**, and/or providing the **specialty** or **address**.

Component: Security Heuristics

- Modeling security knowledge (e.g., incidents, security guidelines and policies, ...)
 - Example for cross-site scripting in iTrust patient view




Component: User Monitoring



Incorporating Security Knowledge


- Now: How to incorporate security knowledge into decision documentation?

- Incorporate potential security vulnerabilities with countermeasures



Incorporating Security Knowledge

Step 1: Group Potential Decisions



- Step 1: One decision is created automatically for each issue with links to all steps of the usage scenario it was found in



- Potential XSS vulnerability for step 3 of use case 6

Use Case 6: View, Designate, Undesignate HCP

1. Display HCP's name, specialty, address.
2. Toggle to designate/undesignate an HCP.
3. Search an HCP by name or address.



- In some cases: Adjust decision grouping or discard them



Incorporating Security Knowledge

Step 2 and 3: Generate Decision Knowledge

- Step 2: Default rules are provided for mapping heuristic knowledge with decision knowledge and generate texts



Heuristic Knowledge	Decision Knowledge	Generated Content for XSS Decision on Use Case 6, Step 3
Vulnerability, System Component	Decision	Prevent <i>Cross-Site Scripting</i> in <i>iTrust Patient View</i>
Counter-measure	Alternative	<i>Sanitize input (link to mitigation strategies of CWE-79)</i>
...		


- Step 3: Add or adapt generated contents, if necessary




- **Comprehensive and fast access to knowledge** on security-related decisions for software engineers and project managers
 - Decision knowledge is incorporated from heuristic findings by a semiautomatic transformation process
- **Awareness for security issues in decision-making** without requiring software engineers or project managers to be security experts

Incorporating User Monitoring Data


- Now: How to incorporate results from user monitoring?



- Case 1: Prioritize heuristic findings
 - Decisions on security requirements, which concern frequently performed usage scenarios, should be handled with priority
 - For instance, if patients perform use case 6 more often than use case 24, an XSS vulnerability should be handled first for use case 6



- Case 2: Uncover required knowledge updates
 - Deviations are uncovered between specified (use cases) and monitored user behavior
 - Documentation component retrieves all decisions related to the use case for which the deviation was found
 - Software engineers can then decide how to update the given documentation



- **Prioritization of decisions** helps software engineers to manage large amounts of potential decisions uncovered by heuristic analysis
- **Updates on security-related decisions and their documentation** can be located easily by software engineers
 - Deviations between specified and observed end user behavior indicate needed updates

- We propose to document decisions on security requirements by incorporating different knowledge sources
- Our approach improves the documentation **quality** and **completeness** for decisions on security requirements
- We are currently developing a prototype to demonstrate our approach within the knowledge management tool UNICASE
- Directions for future work:
 - Evaluation of our approach in a controlled experiment
 - Integration of further knowledge sources for documentation

Thank you for your attention!

Do you have any questions?



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