

# Pattern-Based and ISO 27001 Compliant Risk Analysis for Cloud Systems



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Investition in unsere Zukunft  
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# Context

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
- Cloud computing services
- Security is important for cloud customers
- Certification of applied security mechanisms
- ISO 27001 (tailoring)
- Research project ClouDAT (<http://www.cloudat.de>)

# ISO 27001

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- For certifying cloud computing systems, we selected ISO 27001.
- It provides general concepts for establishing information security risk management.
- ISO 27001:2013: less details on processes than in ISO 27001:2005
- ISO 27001:2013: processes of ISO 27001:2005 are sufficient

# Problem

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- Idea is to create a documentation of the cloud system using patterns and a defined process.
- The risk analysis is an essential element of this documentation.
- The ISO 27001 does not stipulate any method for performing risk analysis.

# How to tackle the problem?

## Method Overview

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



# Phase 1: Instantiate CSAP

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- Cloud System Analysis Pattern (CSAP)
- CSAP was introduced in [\[Beckers2011\]](#)x.
- CSAP is used to describe context and scope

# Phase 1: CSAP instance example

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



## Phase 2: Refine Assets

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



Refines the CloudElements of the CSAP instance  
e.g. by specialization or composition.



# Phase 2: Asset examples

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



# Phase 3: Instantiate threats and vulnerabilities

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- For all identified assets, threats and maybe vulnerabilities are identified
- Threat patterns (TP) are instantiated according to CSAP instance and refined assets

# Phase 3: Threat example

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

An excerpt of identified assets, related threats, and vulnerabilities

| Asset label        | Threat (C)   | Threat (I)  | Threat (A)  | Vulnerability   |
|--------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Controlling Data   | Disclosure of stored <i>Controlling Data</i> of <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i> by an <i>attacker</i> | Modification of <i>Controlling Data</i> by an <i>attacker</i>   | Unavailability of <i>Controlling Data</i> for <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i>              | e.g., gaining access to secured area (C,I,A)  |
| Microsoft Exchange | -  | Modification of <i>Microsoft Exchange</i> by an <i>attacker</i>   | Unavailability of <i>Microsoft Exchange</i> for <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i>            | e.g., impersonate an administrator and install modified Exchange software (I)                             |
| Monitoring Message | Disclosure of communication between <i>virtual machine</i> and <i>employees</i>                | Modification of communication between <i>virtual machine</i> and <i>employees</i> to modify <i>Monitoring Message</i> | Unavailability of communication between <i>virtual machine</i> and <i>employees</i> | e.g., network sniffing to read monitoring messages (C)  |
| Backup             | Disclosure of stored <i>backup</i> of <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i> by an <i>attacker</i>           | Modification of <i>Backup</i> by an <i>attacker</i>   | Unavailability of <i>backup</i> for <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i>                        | e.g., responsible person and all representatives are not available when access to backup is necessary (A) |
| VM Host Server     | -  | Modification of <i>VM Host Server</i> by an <i>attacker</i>   | Unavailability of <i>VM Host Server</i> for <i>LANFER SYSTEMHAUS</i>                | e.g., gaining access to secured area (I,A)  |

## Phase 4: Assess Risks

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- A risk evaluation method with defined risk levels and a risk acceptance level is used.
- For all identified assets, risks are rated according to given threats, vulnerabilities and controls.
- As long as one risk rating is above the risk acceptance level, the process is continued.
- When all risk ratings are below the risk acceptance level, the final documentation for certification can be generated.

# Phase 4: Risk level definition

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Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

## Impact value scale (consequence scale)

| Impact value | Description  |
|--------------|--|
| 1            | no consequence if asset is successfully threatened             |
| 2            | consequence can be easily handled                              |
| 3            | to handle consequences moderate effort is necessary            |
| 4            | to handle consequences high effort is necessary                |
| 5            | company survival uncertain if asset is successfully threatened |

## Security failure likelihood scale (VL:Vulnerability Level, TL: Threat Likelihood)

| Security failure | (VL, TL)               | Description  |
|------------------|------------------------|--|
| 1                | (L,LOW)                | Almost no vulnerability because all identified threats are addressed by controls and attackers have only minor interest  |
| 2                | (M,LOW)                | Basic protection is given and attackers have only minor interest   |
| 3                | (H,LOW) or<br>(L,HIGH) | Possible threats are not addressed by controls and attackers have only minor interest/ Almost no vulnerability because all identified threats are addressed by controls and attackers have an interest to threaten asset |
| 4                | (M,HIGH)               | Basic protection is given and attackers have an interest to threaten asset   |
| 5                | (H,HIGH)               | Possible threats are not addressed by controls and attackers have an interest to threaten asset  |

Acceptance level: 8

# Phase 4: Risk example

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

Business impact (B.I.), likelihoods for security failures (S.F.), and the estimated risk level (R.L.) for identified assets

| Asset label        | B.I<br>(C) | B.I<br>(I) | B.I<br>(A) | S.F.<br>(C) | S.F.<br>(I) | S.F.<br>(A) | R.L.<br>(C) | R.L.<br>(I) | R.L.<br>(A) |
|--------------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Controlling Data   | 4          | 3          | 2          | 3           | 2           | 2           | 12          | 6           | 4           |
| Microsoft Exchange | -          | 2          | 3          | -           | 2           | 2           | -           | 4           | 4           |
| Monitoring Message | 2          | 2          | 2          | 2           | 5           | 3           | 4           | 10          | 6           |
| Backup             | 2          | 2          | 3          | 3           | 2           | 1           | 6           | 4           | 3           |
| VM Host Server     | -          | 1          | 5          | -           | 3           | 3           | -           | -           | 15          |

The ISO 27001 specifies the following treatments:

1. applying appropriate controls
2. accepting risks
3. avoiding risks
4. transferring the associated business risks to other parties

## Phase 5: Instantiate Requirements

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- According to the threats, useful requirement patterns are suggested.
- Requirement patterns are instantiated using the instantiation of the threats.

# Phase 5: Instantiated Requirements

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- SR 1 Preserve confidentiality of stored *controlling data* of the *LANFER SYSTEMHAUS* by preventing disclosure by an *attacker*.
- SR 2 The integrity of communication between *virtual machine* and *employees* shall be preserved.
- SR 3 Manipulation on *VM host server* that leads to the unavailability of it shall be prevented.
- SR 4 Sufficient physical protection shall be implemented (no windows in ground floor, access control for all entries with limited access for visitors, . . . ) to ensure availability regarding the *VM host server*.
- SR 5 Technical malfunctions of the *VM host server* shall not affect the availability of the *provided platform*.



## Phase 6: Instantiate Controls

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- According to the requirement, according to predefined dependencies, useful control patterns are suggested.
- After instantiation of controls, remaining risks are assessed.

# Phase 6: Instantiated Controls

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- C 1 To address security requirement *SR 1*, we apply the controls of ISO 27002:2013, e.g., equipment security (A.11.2), access control (A.9) including the controls according to our mapping, e.g. human resource security (A.7).
- C 2 To address security requirement *SR 2*, cryptographic means for signatures were applied including the necessary measures from ISO 27002:2013 (A.10).
- C 3 To address security requirement *SR 3*, we apply the same controls as for the security requirement *SR 1*. In addition, we apply control A.11.1.
- C 4 Controls addressing security requirement *SR 4* (e.g. A.11.1) were already in place.
- C 5 To address security requirement *SR 5*, controls for redundant servers (A.17.2) have to be applied.

# Phase 7: Generate Documents

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
Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work



- When all risk ratings are below the the risk acceptance level, the final documentation for certification can be generated.
- The generated documentation generally fulfills the ISO 27001 requirements.
- It can be used for certification.
- All artifacts from previous steps are used.

# Conclusion

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- Structured method to perform an ISO 27001 compliant risk analysis
- Using Patterns to reduce effort and use existing knowledge:
  - context and structure with CSAP
  - security requirements with SRP
  - threats with TP
  - controls with CP
- Systematic pattern-based identification of
  - threats using TP and their relationship to CSAP elements
  - security requirements to be fulfilled by appropriate controls using SRP and their relationship to TP
  - controls using CP and their relationship to SRP

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Motivation

Method  
Overview

Method

Conclusion

Future Work

- SaaS and PaaS risk analysis started
- Later phases of ISO 27001
- Improved and completed tool support including validation steps